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8
1 Introduction 
 
This technical report is going to cover digital tachograph (DT) security assessment and definition of an 
adequate level of security of the digital tachograph for the years to come. DT security assessment and 
definition of an adequate level of security of the digital tachograph for the years to come is 
investigated. The possible convergence of driving licenses with DT cards is introduced. Eventual 
expansion of digital tachograph to ITS and possibility of ERCA to be a trust anchor for ITS is 
analysed. 
 
In this document, firstly the current system components of the digital tachograph system and their 
functionality along with provided security mechanisms are summarised, secondly the vulnerabilities of 
the current cryptographic mechanisms and possible solutions are discussed, thirdly the possible 
convergence of driving licenses with DT cards is introduced, finally possible expansion of digital 
tachograph to ITS along with the idea of using Mobile Signature in DTS is introduced. 
 
This report partially answers the Deliverable of Objective 2.2 of the CIDIPRINT 2011 Action Plan 
2011 and adds a chapter for the investigation of ITS for the possible merge of DT to ITS in the future. 
 
The deliverable reads as follows: 
Risk assessment of the digital tachograph system: threads, occurrence and intensity evaluation and 
remedies. Focus on user identity, possible convergence of driving licences with DT cards, frauds, 
privacy, sensitive data access (competition, dangerous or valuable goods, location), DT security 
assessment and definition of an adequate level of security of the digital tachograph for the years to 
come. 
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2 Brief description of the digital tachograph system  
This section describes the basic structure of the recording equipment and its behaviour in normal 
operation. This section contains elements from the Vulnerability report [DT VULNERABILITIES] 
2.1 The recording equipment 
The recording equipment consists of two main elements (see Figure 1):  
 a Motion Sensor (MS) and 
 a Vehicle Unit (VU)  
 
Figure 1 - Schemata of typical recording equipment (extracted from ISO-16844-3) 
 
2.1.1 The Motion Sensor 
As stated in the legislation [DT REGULATION], the purpose of a MS is to provide the VU with 
secured motion data representative of vehicle’s speed and distance travelled. A MS is mechanically 
interfaced to a moving part of the vehicle, which movement can be representative of vehicle’s speed or 
distance travelled.  
In practice a MS is usually screwed into the vehicle’s gear box. Movement detection is provided in 
most cases by a Hall-effect position sensor located in the MS. The Hall-effect position sensor is a non-
contact device that detects the small electromagnetic variations created by the movement of a toothed 
ring inside the gear box or inside the sensor itself. The Hall-effect position sensor converts these 
variations into electrical signals. These signals are processed by a small electronic board inside the 
MS. Real time speed pulses are sent via the cable to the VU. In addition, a secured serial data 
communication signal on the same cable allows for mutual authentication and identification between 
MS and VU, and secured transmission of data. Encryption is carried out by a dedicated crypto-chip 
soldered on the electronic board.  
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Figure 2 - Motion Sensor [SECURITY ATTACKS TO DT] 
 
Every MS is identified by a unique MS identification data which is stored once and for all in the MS 
by the MS manufacturer.  
A MS must be marked with all or if not possible part of its MS identification data. 
If a MS is designed so that it cannot be opened, it shall be designed such that physical tampering can 
be easily detected (e.g. by visual inspection). This is accomplished by sealing the MS in the Workshop 
after pairing with the VU. 
Power to a MS is always supplied by the VU via the Cable. 
There are currently two approved manufacturers of the so-called encrypted MS: Actia and Siemens 
VDO. 
2.1.2 The Vehicle Unit 
The role of a VU is to record, store, display, print and output data related to driver activities. It is 
connected to MS with which it exchanges vehicle’s motion data. 
 
Figure 3 - Vehicle Unit [SECURITY ATTACKS TO DT] 
 
A 4-wire cable connects physically without interruption the MS with the VU. It provides wires for the 
transmission of encrypted data between VU and MS, the supply of energy to the MS, and the 
transmission of real time speed pulses to the VU.  
The cable, the connector of the MS, the electrical characteristics of the data exchanged between the 
MS and the VU and the communication protocol between MS and VU are specified in the standard 
ISO 16844-3. 
There are four approved manufacturers of VU’s: 
Actia, Continental, Stoneridge and Efkon. 
 
A Vehicle Unit (VU) records the following data [DT REGULATION]: 
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2.1.2.1 Equipment Identification Data 
 
Vehicle Unit Identification Data (name and address of the manufacturer, serial part and approval 
numbers, etc.) 
Motion Sensor Identification Number (name and address of the manufacturer, serial part and approval 
numbers, etc.) 
Security Elements (European and Equipment Public Keys, Member State and Equipment Certificates) 
 
2.1.2.2 Driver Card Insertion and Withdrawal Data 
 
At each insertion and withdrawal cycle of a driver, or workshop card, in the equipment, the 
cardholder’s first and last names, his/her card number, insertion and withdrawal date & time, vehicle 
odometer at card insertion and withdrawal, etc. 
2.1.2.3 Driver Activity Data 
 
All driving activities (even without the card inserted), availability, work, rest/break, the driving status 
(single or crew), etc. 
2.1.2.4 Location 
 
Where Daily Work Periods start and/or end 
Driver Card Number 
Date & Time of Entry 
Type of Entry (beginning or end) 
Country & Region (when applicable) 
Vehicle Odometer Value  
2.1.2.5 Odometer Data 
Odometer data are recorded every calendar day at midnight 
2.1.2.6 Detailed Speed Data 
Detailed Speed Data over the last 24 hours (second per second) 
2.1.2.7 Events and Faults Data 
 
Card Conflicts, 
Speed Abuse, 
Power Supply Interruption, 
Card & Recording Equipment Faults, etc. 
2.1.2.8 Calibration Data 
 
Vehicle Parameters (type, size, setting of speed limit) 
Date & Time of Five Most Recent Calibrations with workshops’ details 
2.1.2.9 Time Adjustment Data  
Time adjustment data are the largest five time adjustments with Workshops’ Details 
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2.1.2.10 Control Activity Data 
Date & Time of Control, 
Type of Control, 
Control Card Number and Card Issuing Member State. 
2.1.2.11 Company Locks Data 
Lock-in & Lock-out dates & times, 
Company Card Number and Card Issuing Member State, 
Company Name & Address. 
2.1.2.12 Download Activity Data 
Date & Time of Downloading, 
Company or Workshop Card Number, 
Card Issuing Member State, 
Company or Workshop Name. 
 
2.2 Tachograph Cards 
Central to the introduction of digital tachograph technology is the provision of smart cards for use by 
drivers, companies, calibration workshops and enforcement officers. 
National authorities are responsible for card issuing:  
• general management (issuing, renewal, replacement)  
• security: data protection, driver identification, workshop passwords 
 
 
Figure 4 - Tachograph Cards 
 
2.2.1 Driver Card 
The personal driver card: 
• is a plastic card similar in size to a credit card, with a microchip in it.  
• the card can store all relevant driver data required for EU Drivers Hours regulations including 
break and rest times (see Figure 5).  
• is personalised to the individual driver and valid for 5 years  
• can store information for at least 28 days (with few exceptions) 
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• one card is issued per driver during period of validity (except in the case of a damaged, lost, 
stolen or faulty card).  
• a driver is only authorised to use his/her own personalised card  
• if the card is lost a driver is required to report it and to make an application for a replacement 
card within 7 days of its loss  
• a card may be suspended or withdrawn by an enforcement officer if the card has been falsified, 
if the person using the card is not the legal holder of the card or if the card has been obtained 
by false declaration or forged documents.  
 
Figure 5 - Driver card file structure [DT REGULATION] 
 
The driver card must be made available to law Enforcement Officers on request.  
The legislation requires the driver to either download the data and retain it themselves or allow the 
company to download the data from their driver card and retain for inspection.  
2.2.2 Company Card 
A company card is valid for 5 years and serves to protect company-related data in the VU. The card 
allows a company to download the information from the VU in order to carry out checks on drivers’ 
hours (roster, etc.), as required by the legislation and to maintain the required records for examination 
by Transport Officers. The company card allows a company to lock data recorded in the VU to prevent 
other operators downloading the data. This is necessary to ensure the protection of personal 
information of a company and its driver(s), and details of work patterns and times from competitors. 
This would be important when vehicles are sold or returned to a hire/lease company. 
 
Figure 6 - Company card file structure [DT REGULATION] 
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2.2.3 Workshop Card 
A Workshop Card is valid for 1 year. 
The workshop card is available only to approved calibration workshops. 
Such workshops must be approved by the National Authorities and the workshop fitter must provide 
proof that he/she has received the necessary qualifications.  
If a workshop fitter is employed by more than one workshop, he/she must hold a workshop card for 
each workshop that he/she is working for.  
General Rules: 
• The Workshop manager is responsible for the workshop cards at all times.  
• The Workshop manager is responsible for the return of cards if/when fitters leave their 
employment.  
• If a card cannot be returned such as lost/stolen/malfunctioning the Workshop foreman is 
obliged to notify the Road Authority.  
• The PIN is personal to a fitter and is posted to him/her personally. This should not be disclosed 
to any other person.  
• The Workshop card can only be used by the person to whom it is issued.  
 
Figure 7 – Workshop card file structure [DT REGULATION] 
 
2.2.4 Control Card 
The control card is available only to law Enforcement Authority Officers for carrying out enforcement 
of digital tachograph legislation. 
• A control card enables the mass memory of digital tachographs and driver card data to be 
accessed. 
• Allows printouts of all relevant information to be made at any time. 
• A control card has a maximum validity of 5 years, although some users adopted a shorter one 
(e.g. 2 years). 
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Figure 8 - Control card file structure [DT REGULATION] 
 
3 AETR 
 
The geographic coverage of the digital tachograph system is extended beyond the EU borders (see 
Figure 9) as it has become mandatory for the contracting parties to AETR since 2010. The AETR 
agreement concerns the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport. The 
agreement covers 49 contracting parties (will soon be 50 countries) including all EU Member States. 
Its provisions are aligned with the current EU legislation on driving times, breaks and rest periods. In 
2006 the AETR agreement was amended in order to introduce the use of the digital tachograph. 
European Commission provides root level PKI services to non EU AETR countries according to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, between The European Commission Services and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) which was signed on 23/01/2009. 
 
 
Figure 9  – AETR countries [UNECE] 
 
4 Cryptographic Systems in DTS  
 
This section describes the major characteristics of the cryptographic systems and communication 
protocols in use in the DTS [ERCA POLICY].  
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The key and certificate management in the DTS is depicted in Figure 10. Four entities are depicted: the 
ERCA certification service provider (CSP); an MSCA CSP; and the two types of component 
personaliser (CP): tachograph card or vehicle unit manufacturing; and motion sensor manufacturing. 
The ERCA and MSCA CSPs in Figure 10 create and maintain appropriate secret encryption keys and 
use them to validate digital tachograph security data, only after verifying that the data to encrypt are 
complete, correct, and duly authorised. 
The card, vehicle unit or motion sensor CPs in Figure 10 insert validated security data into digital 
tachograph equipment by appropriately secured means. 
Abbreviations in Figure 10 are as defined in Annex I(B) Appendix 11 [DT REGULATION], ISO / 
IEC 16844-3 Motion sensor interface [ISO-16844-3]. 
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Figure 10  – Description of DT Regulation Annex I(B) key management [ERCA POLICY] 
 
Two different cryptographic systems are used in the DTS: 
• Asymmetric cryptographic system for securing the communication between the VU and the 
Cards, and 
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• Symmetric cryptographic system with splitting key technology for securing communication 
between the VU and MS as well as the communication between VU and the cards. 
4.1 The Public Key cryptographic system in DTS  
 
The asymmetric cryptographic system based on the standard Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used 
for securing the communication between the VU and the tachograph card. The Digital Tachograph 
System European Root Policy [ERCA POLICY] defines the general conditions for the PKI concerned 
and contains accordingly more detailed information. The key management of the PKI system in DTS is 
depicted in Figure 11. Three hierarchical levels are defined: 
• European level, 
• Member State level, and 
• Equipment level. 
 
 
Figure 11 – DT public key management [DT REGULATION] 
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At the European level, European Root Certification Authority (ERCA) generates a single European 
key pair (EUR.SK and EUR.PK). It uses the European private key to certify the Member States’ public 
keys and keeps the records of all certified keys. A change of the European (root) key pair is not 
foreseen in the current system. 
Each Member State of the European Union establishes its own national Member State Authority 
(MSA) usually represented by a state authority, e.g. Ministry of Transport. The MSA runs some 
services, among others the Member State Certification Authority (MSCA). The MSA has to define an 
appropriate Member State Policy (MSA policy) being compliant with the ERCA policy [ERCA 
POLICY]. At the Member State level, each MSCA generates a Member State key pair (MSi.SK and 
MSi.PK). Member States’ public keys are certified by the ERCA (MSi.C). MSCAs use their Member 
State private key to certify public keys to be inserted in equipment (vehicle unit or tachograph card) 
and keep the records of all certified public keys with the identification of the equipment concerned. 
MSCA is allowed to change its Member State key pair. 
At the equipment level, one single key pair (EQTj.SK and EQTj.PK) is generated and inserted in each 
equipment (vehicle unit or tachograph card). Equipment public keys are certified by a Member State 
Certification Authority (EQTj.PK). This key pair is used for  
 authentication between vehicle units and tachograph cards, 
 transport of session keys between vehicle units and tachograph cards, and  
 digital signature of data downloaded from vehicle units or tachograph cards to external media.  
Integrity and authenticity of the entities to be transferred between the different levels of the PKI 
hierarchy are subject to the ERCA and MSA policies. 
The concrete cryptographic algorithm currently being used for the asymmetric cryptographic system is 
the RSA algorithm. All RSA keys have length of modulus of 1024 bits. 
4.2 The symmetric cryptographic system in DTS  
The symmetric cryptographic system for the digital tachograph is based on the splitting key 
technology. Figure 12 represents the general management of the relevant keys. This section builds on 
the materials found in [Automotive IT].  
The ERCA generates two symmetric partial master keys for the MS: Kmwc and Kmvu. The first partial 
key Kmwc is intended to be stored in each workshop tachograph card; the second partial key Kmvu is 
inserted into each VU. The final master key Km results from XOR (exclusive or) operation between 
Kmwc and Kmvu. The additional identification key Kid is calculated as XOR of the master key Km with 
a constant control vector CV. 
The final master key Km and the identification key Kid are used for authentication between the VU 
and the MS as well as for an encrypted transfer of the MS individual pairing key Kp from the MS to 
the VU. The master key Km and the identification key Kid are used merely during the pairing of a MS 
with a VU. They are stored neither in the MS nor in the VU. 
 
 
 
 
 
20
 
Figure 12 – DT key management for the motion sensor [Automotive IT] 
 
Confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the entities to be transferred between the different levels 
of the hierarchy within the tachograph system are subject to the ERCA and MSA policies.  
The concrete cryptographic algorithm currently being used for the symmetric cryptographic system is 
the Triple-DES algorithm. Both Triple-DES partial master keys have an effective length of 112 bits 
(total length of 128 bits) 
4.3 Communication between Vehicle Unit and Tachograph Card 
Appendix 11 of Annex I (B) of the EU regulation [DT REGULATION] provides two communication 
phases at the logical level: 
 
 identification and authentication phase and 
 operational phase. 
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During the first phase both communicating parties authenticate each other. As a result of this 
authentication a common symmetric session key is established. This session key remains valid until 
the card is withdrawn from or reset by the VU. This session key is used for communication between 
the entities during the operational phase. 
 
Figure 13 - Communication between VU and Tachograph card 
 
4.3.1 Mutual Authentication 
 
A mutual authentication between the VU and the Tachograph card is required by the EU regulation 
[DT REGULATION]. Each communicating party should demonstrate to the other that it owns a valid 
tachograph key pair, the public key of which has been certified by a member state certification 
authority, itself being certified by the European certification authority. The mechanism is triggered at 
card insertion by the VU. It starts with the exchange of certificates and unwrapping of public keys, and 
ends with the setting of a session key. Demonstration is made by signing with the equipment private 
key a random number sent by the other party, which must recover the random number received when 
verifying this signature and compare the values of the random number sent with the random number 
received. The relevant protocol (see Figure 14) is defined in Appendix 11 of Annex I (B) of the EU 
legislation. 
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Figure 14 - Mutual authentication according to Appendix 11 of the regulation 
 
4.3.2 Operation 
The operational communication between the VU and the Tachograph card can be performed either  
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 in plain or 
 using secure messaging in authenticated mode or 
 using secure messaging in encrypted and authenticated mode. 
 
The communication at the logical level succeeds by using the smartcard command set defined in 
Appendix 2 of Annex I (B) of the EU regulation. 
 
4.4 Communication between Vehicle Unit and Motion Sensor 
The EU regulation requires the communication protocol between the MS and the VU to be compliant 
with ISO/IEC 16844-3 “Motion Sensor interface” [ISO-16844-3]. This section also use some materials 
found in [Automotive IT].  
 This ISO standard provides two communication phases at the logical level: 
 
 Pairing phase 
 Operational phase 
During the pairing phase a MS will be “paired” with a VU. As a result of this pairing a common 
symmetric session key is established. This session key remains valid until the next pairing and is used 
for communication between the entities within the operational phase. Note that this session key is valid 
for up to 2 years. The pairing can be performed only by an accredited workshop possessing a genuine, 
valid tachograph workshop card. Generally, the MS implements a set of instructions and plays a 
passive role, whereas the VU plays an active role in sending these instructions to the MS.  
 
Figure 15 – Communication between VU and MS  
 
4.4.1 Motion sensor state at the end of production 
 
The European certification authority shall generate two independent and unique Triple DES keys Kmvu 
and Kmwc, and calculate Km as: Km = Kmvu XOR Kmwc 
 
The European root certification authority shall forward these keys, under appropriately secured 
procedures, to Member State certification authorities at their request. 
 
Member State certification authorities shall: 
 use Km to encrypt motion sensor data requested by MS manufacturers, 
 forward Kmvu to VU manufacturers, under appropriately secured procedures, for insertion in 
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VUs, 
 ensure that Kmwc will be inserted in all workshop cards during card personalisation. 
 
The MS shall be prepared for pairing when it leaves the factory, i.e. the following values shall be 
stored in its non-volatile memory: 
 the extended serial-number of the MS in plain text, NS; 
 the extended serial-number of the MS encrypted with the identification key, eKID (NS); 
 the pairing key of the MS in plain text, Kp; 
 the pairing key of the MS encrypted with master key, eKm (Kp). 
 
The master key and identification key shall not be stored in the non-volatile memory of the MS. The 
pairing key shall be unique to each MS. The pairing key is only used to pair the MS  and the VU. The 
two 64 bit halves of the pairing key are distinct. A unique session key is generated during the pairing.  
 
The master key shall not be stored completely within the VU memory. The identification key shall not 
be stored within the VU memory and shall be derived by adding a constant control vector on the 
master key (KID=Km XOR CV). 
 
4.4.2 Necessary sequence of instruction for pairing 
Pairing of a MS with a VU is triggered by a special instruction sent from the VU to the MS. A valid 
tachograph workshop card must be inserted into and accepted by the VU. After a successful mutual 
authentication between the workshop card and the VU, the VU reads out the workshop card part of the 
master key Kmwc. The VU recomputes the final master key from Km = Kmvu XOR Kmwc and the 
identification key KID = Km XOR CV. The VU authenticates itself by the MS using KID. A random 
Triple-DES session key Ks for the operational communication between the VU and the MS is then 
established. In the last step, the MS authenticates itself by the VU using the pairing data, the pairing 
key Kp and Ks. If the mutual authentication was successful, the operational communication continues 
with the session key Ks.  
The pairing process according to ISO 16844-3 is as follows: 
 
 VU Initializes pairing 
 The MS sends its serial number Ns. 
 The VU sends the extended serial number of the MS encrypted with identification key. 
 If the extended serial number of the MS encrypted with identification key, which was stored in its 
non-volatile memory before pairing, is the same as the one received from VU, the MS returns the 
pairing key encrypted with master key. 
 The VU sends the session key, encrypted with pairing key. 
 The session key is decrypted with the pairing key and stored permanently in the non-volatile 
memory of the MS. It shall be changed by every initialization.  
 The VU encrypts the pairing information with the pairing key and shall transmit it to the MS. 
 
 The MS decrypts the pairing information with the pairing key and stores it permanently in the 
non-volatile memory of the MS. The pairing information shall be found at two locations in the 
non-volatile memory: at the location for the first pairing and the location for the last pairing. 
While the pairing information of the first pairing shall never be overwritten, the pairing 
information of the last pairing changes with every pairing. 
 
4.4.3 VU authentication to MS 
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 VU Request for authentication 
 The MS sends the pairing information encrypted with session key. 
 The VU shall decrypt the data bytes with the session key and compare the decrypted data with 
the pairing information of the current pairing. If they are equal, it is assumed that the 
authentication of the MS to the VU is correct and that the MS is using the correct session key. 
 
4.4.4 Communication of MS and VU in normal use 
After having been paired, the MS and the VU can communicate for operational purposes. Three 
different kinds of data can be transmitted from the MS to the VU in response to an appropriate 
instruction: 
 
 real-time movement pulses, 
 secured value of the pulse counter and 
 secured content of the MS files being read by the VU. 
 
The real-time movement pulses are continuously transmitted in plain to the VU without any security 
attribute. The frequency of these pulses depends on the instantaneous velocity of the vehicle and the 
concrete construction of the gearbox, where the MS is mounted (the correct conversion coefficients are 
determined and stored in the VU during its calibration by an approved workshop). 
 
The MS as well as the connected VU each runs a pulse counter. Their values are synchronized 
immediately after the pairing procedure. The VU periodically sends an authentication token to the MS. 
which answers with the random part of the authentication token and the current value of the pulse 
counter encrypted by the session key. The VU compares 
 
 the received parts of the authentication token with the respective value having been sent and 
 the current value of its own pulse counter with the value received from the MS. 
If these comparisons are successful, the VU “knows” that the MS connected is a correct one and no 
real-time pulse has been lost or inserted. 
 
In this way the recording equipment assures the correctness of the mean value of the movement data 
between two subsequent requests for the secured value of the pulse counter. In other words, the trusted 
input from the MS is supplied as the secured counter value. 
 
Some data (like error messages, serial number, pairing data, etc.) permanently stored in the MS are 
organized into files, which can be read by the VU connected. After a special request (including among 
others an authentication token and the file number) the MS sends the content of the requested file 
encrypted with the session key.  
 
The communication of MS and VU in normal use is summarized in ISO 16844-3 as follows: 
 
 The VU sends authentication data to the MS. 
 The VU sends request for response to the MS. 
 If the VU is authorised, the MS sends authentication and sensor data to the VU. 
 
ISO 16844-3 summarizes the sequence of instruction for VU to read data from MS as follows:  
 
 The VU sends authentication data and the number of the requested file to the MS. 
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 The VU sends request for response to the MS. 
 If the VU is authorised, the MS sends authentication and requested data to the VU. 
5 Vulnerabilities and limitations of security mechanisms  
Appendix 10 of Annex IB of the regulation [DT REGULATION] on Generic Security Targets requires 
the minimum strength of the security mechanisms of the MS, the VU and the tachograph cards to be 
high, with a target level of confidence ITSEC1 level E3. Appendix 11 of Annex 1B, Common Security 
Mechanisms, specifies the security mechanisms ensuring that such requirements are fulfilled. This 
section builds on the materials found in [DT VULNERABILITIES]. 
Appendix 11 covers the specifications for: 
 the mutual authentication between VUs and tachograph cards, including session key 
agreement, 
 the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data transferred between VUs and 
tachograph cards, 
 the integrity and authentication of data downloaded from VUs and tachograph cards to external 
storage media. 
The confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data transferred between VU and MS is specified in 
the standard ISO 16844-3. In the following sections, a number of vulnerabilities associated with the 
security mechanisms are discussed. 
The ITSEC E3 HIGH Common Criteria EAL level 4 (with exceptions) should read/follow the better 
description of Common Criteria from the German BSI. 
5.1 DT general security considerations for the future 
This section is revised based on the presentation by Prof.Dr. Ernst G. Giessmann at “Future of the 
Digital Tachograph System Security” meeting in JRC-ISPRA, 05-06/03/2012 [GIESSMANN]. Thanks 
also to Dr.Giessmann’s comments during the brainstorming session of the above mentioned meeting 
which I used to revise this section of the document. 
DT security model should recognize that we are dealing with the ERCA/DT as a closed system which 
hence may face a different scale of risk threats than an open system. Consequently for the update of 
the system security, e.g., the impact of increasing the key length, must be evaluated according to the 
closed system.   
A generic protection profile which defines abstract functionality including the migration concept for 
DT, as the flexibility to update the security in DT is crucial, is needed.  Most important question is 
how to migrate from one algorithm to the next rather than to decide which algorithm to use next. The 
eventually defined DT system Protection Profile would need abstract intent and need to identify the 
functional and conceptual requirements. The Protection Profile shouldn't contain implementation 
details. 
An Algo paper “The crypto in demand “ for the DT closed system which is revised in certain intervals 
of time, e.g., every 5 years, is also needed.  The Algo paper shall contain detailed information 
regarding the use of a certain cryptographic algorithm with certain parameters, e.g., key length, for a 
certain interval of time. The Algo paper could be an appendix to the abstract Protection Profile. 
                                                 
1 The Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) is a structured set of criteria for evaluating computer 
security within products and systems. The ITSEC has been largely replaced by Common Criteria, which provides similarly-
defined evaluation levels and implements the target of evaluation concept and the Security Target document. ITSEC level 
E3 corresponds to common criteria EAL4 security level. 
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5.2 Obsolescence of Security Mechanisms 
The legislation does not accommodate a way to deal with the continuous progress made in 
cryptography and in cracking ciphers, and consequently, with the obsolescence of the prescribed 
security mechanisms.  
The strength of a number of security mechanisms of Appendix 11 is below the level currently 
requested for ITSEC High. This threatens the continued delivery of security certification for new DT 
equipment by security certification authorities.  
Although, exceptionally, security certification has continued until now to be granted on condition that 
the actual security mechanisms have not been defeated in practice and the risk of the defeat of the 
security mechanisms is low because of the fact that the DTS is a closed system.  
The design of Digital Tachograph System should be reviewed to allow adaptation of its security 
mechanisms so as to maintain over time an adequate level of strength. 
In the following parts, elements of security mechanisms subject to obsolescence are described. 
 
5.2.1 Digest Algorithm SHA-1  
The Digest algorithm is used to compute the digest value of the message to be signed in the process of 
preparing the message for digital signature. In modern digital signature applications the message digest 
is prepared on the computer and sent to the smart card where the RSA2 algorithm or a relevant 
algorithm together with the private key is used to generate the signature from the digest value. 
Afterwards the signature generated is sent back to the computer from the smart card. 
The Digest algorithm is a one way function which takes a message as an input and gives a fixed length 
digest value as the output. Since it is a one way function it is not possible to produce the original 
message from the digest value. Also there is no way to have the same message digest value from two 
different messages. The strength of the message digest algorithm depends on these two properties of 
digest functions.  
SHA-1, which is 160-bit message digest algorithm proposed by US government standards agency 
NIST3, is used in digital tachograph system. Both digital signature on the downloaded data and the 
digital signature on the public key certificates utilize SHA-1 digest algorithm. 
SHA1 hash algorithm is vulnerable in collusion attack but not broken yet. This attack is not applicable 
in DT closed system. 
According to NIST Recommendation for Key Management SHA-1 provides a level of security that is 
below the recommended minimum level for the security applications after 2010. Consequently, It is 
recommended to replace SHA1 with stronger “SHA-2” family of hash functions. 
 
5.2.2 RSA Key Length 
RSA is the cryptographic algorithm being currently provided for the asymmetric cryptographic system 
in the DTS. RSA keys currently used in DTS have a length of modulus of 1024 bits. In the literature, it 
is forecasted that a RSA 1024 key length could be broken in an academic set-up around 2016 using 
                                                 
2 RSA (from the names Rivest, Shamir and Adleman who first publicly described the algorithm) is an algorithm for public-
key cryptography. It is the first algorithm known to be suitable for signing as well as encryption, and one of the first great 
advances in public key cryptography. RSA is widely used in electronic commerce protocols, and is believed to be secure 
given sufficiently long keys and the use of up-to-date implementations. 
3 National Institute of Standards and Technology 
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substantial computer power. A similar attack would still need to be carried out afterwards by malicious 
attackers on the digital tachograph keys, before the keys are broken.  
RSA key length of 1024 is not considered a measure providing sufficient strength to the security 
mechanisms of the DTS [Automotive IT]. In order to gain type approval for a component of the 
tachograph system this component must obtain security certificate, whereby the strength of security 
mechanisms must be confirmed to be “high”. Consequently, also the security mechanisms 
implementing RSA must be of a high strength, which depends concretely also on the length of 
modulus. 
It is an established practice to reconsider the cryptographic strength from time to time as new attack 
techniques are constantly being invented. In order to deal with this fact the responsible national 
authorities define time restrictions for using cryptographic algorithms as “high-secure” algorithms 
beforehand. In practice, each Member State has its own guideline for it, which is not made generally 
public. In Germany such a guideline is public and allows the use of the 1024-bit sized RSA as “high-
secure” merely until end of 2007, in the context of the German Digital Signature Law. 
In order to maintain the security level of the system as high it is recommended to move to RSA Key 
length of 2048 bits or longer after 2010 according to NIST Recommendation for Key Management. 
5.2.3 Moving to longer keys of RSA 
In order to maintain the security level one solution would be to use longer keys (e.g. 2048 bits). This 
will solve the problem for a while (e.g., 5 years) and after the longer keys will not be able to maintain 
the security level. Then it will be necessary to increase the key length again. At this point it is 
important to have flexibility in the system to enable increasing the key length and even change the 
cryptographic algorithm.   
However increasing the key length has an impact on the certificate verification time and RSA 
operations on the card delaying the response time of the card. It is necessary to use faster algorithm 
providing high security with shorter key length. 
We have no security problem (today) for smart cards but it is necessary to listen to the alarm signals.  
Tachograph PKI can consider consider different security at different hierarchy levels e.g. RSA1024 on 
smartcards and RSA 2048 or better for ERCA and MSCAs. Since MSCA certificate is verified on the 
card less frequently than VU certificate, increasing the key length of ERCA/MSCA will not have a 
significant effect on the card performance.  
 
5.2.4 Elliptic Curve algorithm 
As increasing the key length of the RSA algorithm will have a significant impact on the performance 
of the system as the RSA encryption and decryption will take much longer time with longer keys, as a 
result the mutual authentication will take longer time. Therefore a better solution would be to switch to 
elliptic curve algorith (e.g., ecdsa-sha256) as it provides higher level of security with shorter keys.  
Eliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm may be considered to replace RSA although they need a 
very strong Random Number Generator (RNG). Some systems have been found in internet SSL that 
use the same RNG due to hardware limitations. ECC devices will need extra protection against side 
channel power attacks. Although the side channel protection on the cards for ECC is not as mature as 
for RSA, still high quality vendors, e.g., NXP, Infineon, Gemalto have implemented side channel 
protection. 
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5.2.5 Triple DES Encryption Mechanism 
The Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) encryption mechanism is used in secure messaging 
between cards and VUs as well as between VUs and MS. It is a symmetric key encryption mechanism 
which provides authenticity and confidentiality for the data transferred between two entities. 
Triple DES, which is also called as TDEA, is defined by [NIST-SP800-67]. The algorithm encrypts 
and decrypts data in 64-bit blocks, using three 56-bit keys. According to NIST Recommendation for 
Key Management 2TDEA provides 80 bits of security which is below the required level after 2010 
although TDES in DTS has not been attacked yet. It is still recommended to switch to AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) with 128 or longer keys after 2010. 
5.3 Master Key for the Motion Sensor 
A universal master key for the MS is used for the pairing between the VU and the MS. The key is split 
(XOR) into two parts. One half is stored in the workshop cards, while the other half is stored in the 
VUs. If this master key is compromised, the security of the overall tachograph system is jeopardised. 
In detail, the consequences are as follows: 
 The observation of the pairing protocol discloses the session key. An additional simulating 
device can be used in operation that is placed between the VU and the MS. 
 The initiation of the pairing protocol can be invoked without use of a workshop card. 
 Cloning of MSs will be feasible. 
There are no precautions taken to replace this master key in the actual key management design. 
Moreover, the pairing master key is stored at different places and if it goes lost then it will not be 
possible to identify where it was lost. Introducing new workshop cards the renewal of the pairing key 
should be considered. This is at most not a matter of cryptography but of organizational protection 
[GIESSMANN] 
Symmetric authentication scheme should be investigated to replace the current splitting key 
implementation for the future [CWA14890-1]. 
 
5.4 PIN Management of the Workshop Card 
There exists vulnerability in the procedure that takes place between a VU and a workshop card at the 
moment of the authentication of the workshop card using its PIN. The authentication is not protected 
nor verified by encryption. It is therefore relatively easy to use a workshop card even without knowing 
its PIN. The security provided by the PIN of a workshop card is therefore very low.  
The PIN is transferred in clear by the digital tachograph to the workshop card as part of the mutual 
authentication sequence. Internally, the workshop card verifies the PIN value and returns an “OK” or 
“KO” message. A “KO” return value results in a failed authentication. After five unsuccessful PIN 
authentication events, the workshop card is blocked, and cannot be reset to an operational mode. 
There are two technical issues. First, the PIN is sent in clear by the tachograph; an interception of the 
PIN value at the communication line is possible. 
Second, the protocol does not include a message authentication for the return value. The return code 
“OK” can stem from an additional device in between that blocks the “Verify PIN” request. 
Note that the digital tachograph is not a physically secure PIN-entry device. There are no physical 
requirements to secure the path between the keyboard and the processing unit. 
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5.5 Communication Protocol of ISO 16844-3 
The standard ISO 16844 supports and facilitates the communication between electronic units and a 
digital tachograph. Part 3 [ISO-16844-] of the standard specifies the physical and data link layers of 
the electrical interface connecting a MS to a VU. In particular it specifies the communication protocol 
that encrypts all information exchange between the MS and the VU during mutual authentication and 
speed data transmission.  
This communication protocol is the result of a standardization effort carried out by industrials. It was 
adapted incrementally a number of times to fix a vulnerability that would allow the injection of false 
data in the communication between the MS  and the VU.  
As a result the protocol is complex and not fully aligned with the standard used currently for security 
certification. It is likely that, currently, a thorough security evaluation of the standard would most 
likely not successfully pass the required security certification. 
Additionally, it is felt that the complexity of the security countermeasures introduced to reinforce the 
protocol is such that interoperability between cards and VUs is difficult to assure by industrials. 
5.6 Data downloaded from Vehicle Unit 
Data blocks downloaded from VUs are signed, but most are not time stamped individually. As a 
consequence, downloaded data can be manipulated by software: blocks extracted from files 
downloaded at a different moment in time can be pasted together and presented as a plausible 
downloaded file. Different scenarios can exploit this vulnerability. It is possible to tamper data 
downloaded at the premises of the undertaking so as to withdraw, for instance, undesired list of events 
and faults, an entire day of activity, or the last activities of a day. Also, it is possible to paste blocks 
downloaded using different company cards, in effect selectively hiding activities protected by 
company locks. 
While this threat is real and technically easy to implement, there is no evidence that it is currently 
exploited, likely because roadside checks are not affected at all (roadside enforcers download 
unadulterated data). There exist a simple solution, which is also backward compatible with the current 
DTS, which would solve the scenario of using the activities until the middle as the activity for the 
whole day. 
5.7 Replacement of the ERCA private keys 
Currently, it is not foreseen the possibility to use private keys different than those initially generated 
by the competent bodies at the start-up of the implementation of the digital tachograph system.  
Consequently there is no predefined procedure to follow in the case that a private key is lost or 
disclosed.  
In the case of a loss of a private key at national or European level, the direct consequence is that no 
new certificates at national or European level, respectively, can be generated. 
In the case a private key is disclosed, integrity and authentication of the data which is certified by the 
key cannot be trusted any more. 
In both cases, there is the need to generate new keys and introduce them quickly in the system. 
5.8 Public Key certificate structure 
A public key certificate is an electronic document which uses a digital signature of a Certification 
Authority to bind together a public key with an identity (information such as the name of a person or 
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an organization, their address, and so forth). The certificate is used to verify that the public key 
belongs to the identity. 
In the DTS, the certificates are issued to the equipments rather than the persons. As a result the digital 
signature is not legally binding. X.509 certificates could be issued to the persons rather than the 
equipments but then because of the larger size of the certificate there would be a significant impact on 
the card response time as the certificate verification on the card would take longer time. 
 
5.8.1 Current Tachograph Certificate 
The current certificate structure in Digital Tachograph System for 1024-bit RSA public keys is 
described in Annex I(B) Appendix11 CSM_017 and CSM_018. The contents of the certificate consist 
of the data as depicted in the Table 1, while the structure of the certificate is depicted in Table 2 
 
 
Data Format Bytes Observations 
CPI INTEGER 1 Certificate profile identifier (‘01’ for the current 
version) 
CAR OCTET STRING 8 Certification authority reference 
CHA OCTET STRING 7 Certificate holder authorization 
EOV TimeReal 4 Certificate end of Validity. Optional, ‘FF’ padded if 
not used 
CHR OCTET STRING 8 Certificate holder reference 
n OCTET STRING 128 Public key(modulus) 
e OCTET STRING 8 Public key(public exponent) 
Table 1 - DTS certificate contents with 1024-bit RSA key length 
 
RSA Public key certificates used in DTS are non-self-descriptive Card Verifiable Certificates [ISO-
7816-8]. Unlike X.509 certificates, Card Verifiable Certificates (CVS) are signed using a signature 
scheme with message recovery. This saves space and time because essentially only the signature value 
has to be stored and to be transmitted rather than the signature value together with the plaintext 
contents. Furthermore, CVC’s do not contain data elements that are hard to be verified on a card, like 
the validity period [HENNIGER]. The temporal validity is not verified during the certificate 
verification on the card.  
 
In DTS the certificate holder’s unique identity is not present in the public key certificate structure. As a 
result, the digital signature generated has no legal value according to [E-SIGN-DIRECTIVE].  
 
CVC is chosen for DTS mainly because of small size, which enables faster verification on the card, 
and role based authorisation capability as it contains Certificate Holder Authorisation filed which 
enables role based authorisation in the system. 
 
The current public key certificate content in Table 1 is digitally signed as shown below according to 
the digital signature mechanism with partial recovery in accordance with ISO/IEC 9796-2, with the 
Certification Authority Reference appended. 
 
 X.C = X.CA.SK[‘6A’||Cr||Hash(Cc)||’BC’]||Cn||X.CAR 
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Here X.C represents the public key certificate generated; X.CA.SK represents the secret key of the CA 
which is used in the RSA operation to generate the encrypted part of the digital signature structure 
explained in Table 2.  
 
Data Format Bytes Observations 
6Ah INTEGER 1 ISO 9796-2 signature recoverable message 
start byte 
Cr OCTET STRING 106 ISO 9796-2 signature recoverable message 
Hash(Cc) 
 
OCTET STRING 20 ISO 9796-2 SHA-1 hash of message 
(certificate contents) 
BCh INTEGER 1 ISO 9796-2 signature trailer byte 
Cn OCTET STRING 58 ISO 9796-2 non-recoverable message 
CAR OCTET STRING 8 Certification authority reference 
Table 2 - DTS certificate structure with ISO 9796-2:1997 signature 
 
The Certification Authority Reference (CAR) field which is added to the signature is not checked with 
the one in the signed data, it should be checked that the outside X.CAR is the same as inside the 
X.CAR during the verification of the certificate.  
 
5.8.2 X509 Certificate 
The public key contained in the certificate is used to verify digital signatures that have been created 
using the corresponding private key. The digital signatures to be verified could, for instance, be created 
for the purpose of authenticating the certificate owner against the card in a challenge-response protocol 
using public-key cryptography. For the purpose of device authentication, card-verifiable certificates 
are used. As explained in [HENNIGER], the attribute “card-verifiable” may suggest that other 
certificate formats, like X.509 [X509] certificates, could not be verified on smart cards, but this is not 
entirely true. The authentication against the card can be carried out using the widely used X.509 
certificates, without a card-specific certificate format. An essential part of the verification of X.509 
certificates on smart cards is possible, although it will have a significant impact on the card response 
time, yet it is still not possible checking the temporal validity of the certificate and checking whether 
the certificate has been revoked.  
 
The reason to choose CVS in the DTS was the need to verify the certificate on the smart card during 
the mutual authentication process thanks to the small size of CVS which enables faster verification on 
resource constrained environment of cards.  
 
The certificate structure in Table 3 could be used if, despite the issues mentioned above,  X.509 will be 
decided to be used in the future. 
 
Certificate 
fields 
  Type Typical values 
version Integer 3 
serialNumber Integer 45566 
signature AlgorithmIdentifier {1 2 840 113549 1 1 5} 
issuer RDNSequence CN= Member State Certification 
Authority, L=ISPRA, C=IT 
TBSCertificate 
validity UTCTime Jan 28, xx10 
Jan 28, xx12 
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subject RDNSequence CN= NAME SURNAME, 
SERIALNUMBER= 
15869063592,C=TR 
subjectPublicKey
Info 
BIT STRING 30 81 89 02 81 81 00 c5 5f 4c 57 
a1 df b9 ad 55 b1 dc 65 5d e6 73 
e6 5b 92 0d 6e 75 20 46 7a d9 ….. 
certificateHolder
Authorisation 
Extension 1 : Digital Tachograph Driver 
Certificate 
Signature 
Algorithm 
  AlgorithmIdentifier {1 2 840 113549 1 1 5} 
signature   BIT STRING 4281a84b3a2e8fc3d254f719ae01b
872d4407e4476bd321d3d5ebbd7
1c9a….. 
Table 3 - X09 certificate content for possible proposal for future DTS 
 
 
Certificate holder authorization data element (CHA) which exists in the current DTS certificate 
identifies the role that the certificate holder is allowed to take. Equipment type field in the CHA must 
be added to X.509 as depicted in Table 3.  Extension type can be used for this purpose.  
 
5.9 Driver card authentication 
An authentication mechanism between the driver and his driver card is not present in the current DTS. 
It is, however, important to ensure that the user of a driver card is indeed the genuine owner of the 
card.  
One approach is that the driver card requires a PIN in order for the driver to prove that he is the owner 
of the card that is being used. The authentication of the driver to the system cannot be considered to be 
fully established without the use of a PIN or of some other authentication methods (e.g., biometric 
authentication). 
5.10  Signature verification and certificate revocation 
Digital signature verification is the process of checking the integrity and authenticity of the signed data 
in the online systems where the signature verification process involves the revocation checking of the 
signing certificate which requires reference to signing certificate and revocation information provided 
to the verification software.  
In the public key infrastructures based on X.509 the revocation information is provided over OCSP 
(Online Certificate Status Protocol) servers or CRL (Certificate Revocation List), which require online 
connection. Certificate serial number is used to uniquely identify a certificate while revocation 
reference is used to check if the certificate is valid during the revocation checking when verifying a 
certificate.  
The ERCA maintains a CRL for Member State certificates but there is no CRL for the certificates in 
the tachograph cards or vehicle units. As the equipment certificates are verified on the cards, adding 
revocation checking on the card would have a significant impact on the performance which would 
result in longer card response time.  
Consequently, since DTS is an offline system and certificate is verified on the card, it is not feasible to 
introduce revocation service for the verifications on the card. Although revocation service can be 
considered for the digital signature verification of the downloaded data. 
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5.11 Standardization of security mechanisms 
 
5.11.1 Digital Signature standardization 
In the DTS, ISO/IEC 9796-2:1997 [ISO-9796-2] standard scheme is used for digital signatures on the 
public key certificates and PKCS#1 v1.5 is used for the digital signatures on the downloaded data. 
These schemes have become obsolete and are now superseded by modern and robust standards.  
Following attacks around the year 2000, the ISO 9796-2:1997 standard has been revised into ISO 
9796-2:2002. ISO 9796-2:2002 defines mechanisms that have some strong, undefeated, security 
arguments. The attacks against ISO 9796-2:1997 appear, however, impracticable in the context of the 
DTS, because an attacker has no way to obtain the many signatures of fixed data necessary to carry out 
the attacks. These attacks do not work on the ISO 9796-2:2002 [ISO-9796-2002] standard. 
Similarly, PKCS#1 v1.5 [PKCS 1.5] has been superseded by a newer version, v2.1, of which digital 
signatures have some strong, undefeated, security arguments.  
Ad-hoc signature PKCS #1 V.1.5 is prone to side channel attacks as to be signed data is not 
randomized before the signature generation takes place.  PKCS #1 V.2.1 [PKCS 2.1]  uses salt on the 
data to be signed which makes it stronger against side channel attacks. 
 
5.11.2 Mutual Authentication Mechanism 
Although there is no known attack against it, the mutual authentication mechanism used between 
tachograph cards and VUs is “non standard”. 
The protocol discussed in section 5.3.1 has also disadvantage that the card is revealing its identity and 
certificate before it has verified the credentials of the VU. This could be viewed as a violation of the 
privacy of the card holder [CWA14890-1]. 
The fact that the mutual authentication mechanism in DTS is “non standard” is not vulnerability itself, 
still it can be formalized in the system, e.g., "internal standard of the mutual authentication between 
tachograph cards and VU's" 
Device authentication with privacy protection is recommended for the future DTS [CWA14890-1] for 
the mutual authentication mechanism in DTS. 
5.12 Vulnerability of data stored on Driver Card 
Driver cards do not have a security mechanism to check and trace the origin of a modification of their 
stored data. Modification of driver card data is done via any VU and is allowed thanks to a private key 
allowing such editing function. If the security of the private key of a single VU is compromised, then it 
is possible with this key, without time limitation, to tamper data stored on any driver card. In a future 
system, this risk could be mitigated by changing the method and the information that is stored on the 
driver cards. 
5.13  Key certification requests 
 
Annex A of the Digital Tachograph System European Root Policy document [ERCA POLICY] 
explains the public key certificate request format arriving from the member states to ERCA. The 
request carries the digital signature generated by the private key of the member state, the 
corresponding public key of which is enclosed in the certification request. The protocol demonstrates 
that the entity submitting the certification request possesses the private RSA key associated with the 
public RSA key whose certification by the ERCA is requested.  
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The requests are brought to ERCA by a trusted courier on a CD. The hash of the public key to be 
certified by ERCA is verified by a telephone call to the identified contact point of the national 
authority. In that way it is asserted that the public key is coming from the identified national authority. 
The public key certification requests can be sent to ERCA by e-mail encrypted by PGP public key of 
ERCA. The motion sensor master key distribution needs to be continued via the courier as the 
symmetric master keys needs to be kept confidential. 
 
6 Merge of Driver Card with E-Driving License 
With the presentation “PKI considerations for the next generation digital tachograph” at the Smart 
Event 2011 in Sophia Antipolis in France [DT PKI] the merge of the tachograph driver card with the e-
Driving license was suggested offering also the use of the ERCA experience for the top level PKI 
services for e-Driving license and Intelligent Transport Systems. According to the suggestion the 
tachograph card application could be added to the same card with e-Driving license as a second 
application as it is seen in Figure 16. The current card technology (e.g., java cards) supports the 
hosting of more than one application in the same card.  
Having a separate security evaluation for each application in the same card is possible according to 
different level of security.  
The security evaluation includes chip security, card operating system security and application security. 
In the merged card the chip and the card operating system must satisfy the higher security requirement 
between the security level of Tachograph card and driving license. 
Even though it is possible to have separate security evaluation for each application in the same card, it 
is still recommended to select the higher level security target and evaluate the card including both 
applications on the card according to the selected level of security. 
UICC protocol can be used to use two crypto set on the card at the same time. Merging the tachograph 
card with e-Driving license is technically straightforward but the management of the merged card 
needs to be investigated. Ownership of the card is a question when hosting more than one application 
on the card. The merge of the two cards needs to be evaluated in terms of the two regulations and the 
synchronization of the two separate processes. Two cards have different lifetimes and issued by 
different bodies and involve different procedures. 
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Figure 16  - ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 DL Data Groups with Digital Tachograph as a second application 
 
 
6.1 Benefits of the merge 
 
• Drivers only carry one card instead of two 
• No need for cross identity link 
• Potential fraud reduction 
• Merged cards could reduce running costs for card issuing authorities 
• It will be easier for enforcers to determine whether tachograph card holder has correct driving 
entitlement. [CORTE] 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Considerations for the future DTS 
 
Digital Tachograph
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7.1 DT evolution to ITS-S  
 
This section builds on several ETSI ITS standards and the presentation by Scott Cadzow at “Future of 
the Digital Tachograph System Security” meeting in JRC-ISPRA, 05-06/03/2012 [CADZOW]. Thanks 
also to Mr CADZOW’s comments during the brainstorming session of the above mentioned meeting 
which I used along this section of the document. 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) can be the address of the research on the future Digital 
Tachograph system. The idea of expansion of Digital Tachograph to ITS needs to be investigated.  
During the revision process towards the next generation Digital Tachograph, it must kept in mind that 
ITS could replace DT in a decade. Working on a generic protection profile for DT which allows 
eventual expansion to ITS could facilitate the future developments in DT to converge to ITS. 
Evolution of ERCA towards a Root CA as central trust anchor for ITS needs also to be considered in 
the research for the future DTS. 
 
In the following subsections ITS architecture is introduced. 
 
7.1.1 intelligent transportation systems 
 
The term intelligent transportation systems (ITS) refers to information and communication technology 
applied to transport infrastructure and vehicles that improve transport outcomes such as transport 
safety, transport productivity, travel reliability, informed travel choices, social equity, environmental 
performance and network operation resilience.[WIKIPEDIA] 
Interest in ITS comes from the problems caused by traffic congestion and a synergy of new 
information technology for simulation, real-time control, and communications networks. Traffic 
congestion has been increasing worldwide as a result of increased motorization, urbanization, 
population growth, and changes in population density. Congestion reduces efficiency of transportation 
infrastructure and increases travel time, air pollution, and fuel consumption. 
Intelligent transport systems vary in technologies applied, from basic management systems such as car 
navigation; traffic signal control systems; container management systems; variable message signs; 
automatic number plate recognition or speed cameras to monitor applications, such as security CCTV 
systems; and to more advanced applications that integrate live data and feedback from a number of 
other sources, such as parking guidance and information systems; weather information; bridge deicing 
systems; and the like. Additionally, predictive techniques are being developed to allow advanced 
modelling and comparison with historical baseline data.  
Technological advances in telecommunications and information technology, coupled with state-of-the-
art microchip, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification), and inexpensive intelligent beacon sensing 
technologies, have enhanced the technical capabilities that will facilitate motorist safety benefits for 
intelligent transportation systems globally. Sensing systems for ITS are vehicle- and infrastructure-
based networked systems, i.e., Intelligent vehicle technologies. Infrastructure sensors are indestructible 
(such as in-road reflectors) devices that are installed or embedded in the road or surrounding the road 
(e.g., on buildings, posts, and signs), as required, and may be manually disseminated during preventive 
road construction maintenance or by sensor injection machinery for rapid deployment. Vehicle-sensing 
systems include deployment of infrastructure-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure electronic 
beacons for identification communications and may also employ video automatic number plate 
recognition or vehicle magnetic signature detection technologies at desired intervals to increase 
sustained monitoring of vehicles operating in critical zones. 
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Figure 17  ITS technologies [ETSI ITS] 
 
7.1.2 Cooperative systems on the road 
The concept of Intelligent Transport Systems and Services (ITS) includes cooperative systems for 
vehicles communicating via radio interface with each other and with the roadside infrastructure. 
Cooperative systems will enhance the support available to drivers and other road users, providing for 
greater transport efficiency and increased safety. 
Communication cooperation on the road includes car-to-car, car-to-infrastructure, and vice versa. Data 
available from vehicles are acquired and transmitted to a server for central fusion and processing. 
These data can be used to detect events such as rain (wiper activity) and congestion (frequent braking 
activities). The server processes a driving recommendation dedicated to a single or a specific group of 
drivers and transmits it wirelessly to vehicles.  
The goal of cooperative systems is to use and plan communication and sensor infrastructure to increase 
road safety.  
• ITS are often classified into the following categories [CADZOW]:  
– Advanced Traveller Information Systems (ATIS) 
– Advanced Traffic Management Systems (ATMS)  
– ITS-Enabled Transportation Pricing Systems 
– Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Integration (VII) 
– Vehicle-to-Vehicle Integration (V2V) 
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• ITS stations send environmental (event) and (vehicle) status data to other ITS stations 
– DNN, CAM 
• ITS stations may exist in vehicles 
• ITS stations may exist in roadside furniture 
• ITS stations may be networked together 
• Interpretation of received data may assist in driver safety 
– E.g. Collision avoidance 
• Interpretation of received data may assist in regulatory compliance 
– E.g. Speed limit notification and adherence 
• Different data has different authority 
– E.g. Speed limit notification from an authority versus speed assertion from an ITS 
station 
 
 
7.1.3 Automotive systems 
There are currently the following projects related to automotive ITS [ETSI ITS]: 
• Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) provide communications between the vehicle 
and the roadside in specific locations (for example toll plazas). Applications such as Electronic 
Fee Collection (EFC) will operate over DSRC. 
• Wireless Communications Systems dedicated to Intelligent Transport Systems and Road 
Transport and Traffic Telematics will provide network connectivity to vehicles and 
interconnect them. Using radio bands requires adequate Harmonized Standards which are under 
development for the bands 5 GHz and 63 GHz. 
• Continuous Air interface Long and Medium range (CALM) provides continuous 
communications between a vehicle and the roadside using a variety of communication media, 
including cellular, 5 GHz, 63 GHz and infra-red links. CALM will provide a range of 
applications, including vehicle safety and information, as well as entertainment for driver and 
passengers. 
These technological projects form part of wider initiatives on matters such as road safety (for example 
the European Commission's eSafety initiative) and road tolling. 
7.1.4 Railway systems 
The railways industries have agreed to use GSM for the signaling on high speed railways, as well as 
for conventional railways when interoperating across national borders. Within Europe, interoperability 
of high-speed railways is a regulatory requirement, addressed by the European Commission's Directive 
96/48/EC. 
7.1.5 Aeronautical and maritime systems 
Aeronautical applications extend from professional services, such as air traffic control systems, to 
services for passengers, such as onboard telephony, and ETSI is responsible for specifying many of 
them. 
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Maritime applications support routine maritime operations, including navigation, as well as safety 
purposes. ETSI is responsible for producing a range of technical standards and reports concerning 
radio equipment and system for maritime and inland waterways use.  
 
7.1.6 ITS Architecture Standards 
 
In April 2010, ISO published the ITS communications architecture standard ISO 21217, which is part 
of the published basic set of communication standards for cooperative systems in ITS. In September 
2010, the ETSI version of the ITS communications architecture standard EN 302 665 was published 
[H.J. Fischer]. 
IEEE 1609 is developing an ITS communications architecture standard (IEEE 1609.0) for short-range 
5.9GHz (IEEE 802.11/1609 (WAVE)) communications only (V2V / V2I) 
Basic design principles of the ITS communications architecture are: 
• Standards are enabling (different to system specifications) 
• Major focus is on the management needs, given by the various communication protocols and 
supported implementations. 
• A distinct class of communication devices with various possible access technologies is necessary to 
meet ITS requirements. 
• ITS Stations (ITS-S) should be capable of communicating over present and future communication 
networks, esp. the Internet (IPv6) 
• ITS-Ss should be capable of communicating with legacy nodes on any network to which they can 
attach. 
• Communication between ITS-Ss and between ITS-Ss and legacy nodes in most cases will be peer to 
peer. 
7.1.7 ITS Station Concept 
 
Figure 18 -  ITS applications as part of the ITS station reference architecture [EN-302665] 
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The concept of an ITS station is based on protocols of the OSI model for communications, operating in 
a bounded secure management domain. 
Communications Access for Land Mobiles (CALM ) communication standards are built on the basis of 
the well-known layered OSI model, which was simplified and extended in order to define the ITS 
station reference architecture [ISO-21217], which consists of six parts Applications, Management, 
Access, Networking & Transport, Facilities and Security). 
The six functional blocks are interconnected via Interfaces (e.g. SAPs, APIs, plug-and-play interfaces). 
These interfaces need to be specified in order to allow for components of an ITS station provided by 
different manufacturers, and in order to support distributed implementations of an ITS station in 
various physical units. 
The Security entity provides means to secure communications and the ITS station [CALM-ITS]. 
The Managmenet entity provides means to manage the ITS station. 
All of these are used by Applications, which contains ITS-S applications. 
The six blocks are interconnected via Interfaces [ISO-24102], which may be e.g. service access points 
(SAPs), application programmer interfaces (APIs) or plug-and-play interfaces. 
The term ITS station (ITS-S) identifies the functionality provided by these six blocks. CALM 
standards do not specify any ITS-S application. Therefore, CALM goes beyond communications - it 
considers ITS-S applications as part of the Bounded Secured Managed Domain (BSMD) 
 
 
 
 
7.1.8 ITS Station Reference Architecture 
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Figure 
19 : 
Examples of possible elements in the ITS station reference architecture [EN-302665] 
 
Figure 19 depicts Examples of possible elements in the ITS station reference architecture. ITS-S 
Infrastructure is light or no infrastructure is required. Hence, 
– ITS-S can be installed in roadside furniture 
– ITS-S can be an “app” in a smartphone [CADZOW] 
 
 
7.1.9 ITS-S Security  
ITS-S has a HSM element. For security evaluations ITS-S needs risk analysis per target of evaluation 
(TOE) 
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Figure 20 : ITS-S (Vehicle) as the TOE [ETSI TR 102 893] 
 
 
7.1.10 Privacy in ITS 
• The reason for travel is often personal 
– Leisure, work, family travels are not open for all to see and exploit 
• A traveller’s viewpoint is too low to see the “right path” 
– Needs help from a trusted authority with a better viewpoint 
• Asking for directions is naturally a verbal/aural process 
– Often doesn’t just concern the shortest/quickest route but the one that fits to the person 
(e.g. via this type of shop, suitable for a baby buggy, with indoor secure bike parking 
close to the destination, …) 
• ITS-S shall not release identity or identity revealing data to unknown parties 
– Problem: no known parties (ad hoc peer to peer all informed network) 
– Suggested solution [C2CC]:  
• Sign every message but with different signing identity but common 
(authorisation) authority 
• Double blind identity from authority [CADZOW] 
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Figure 21-  Identity behaviour in ITS [CADZOW] 
 
 
7.1.11 Trust in ITS 
Trust is developed over time from the analysis of actions, reactions, and contributions 
– Requires observation and interaction over time 
– Requires contextual knowledge 
– Trusting party-A in context-X does not mean having to trust party-A in context-Y 
[CADZOW] 
 
7.1.12 PKI and Certificates 
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Figure 22: ITS PKI and certificates [CADZOW] 
 
 
7.1.13 Certificate Authority 
 
• CAs are the basis of PKIs 
• There might be several CAs 
– Vehicle enrolment CA 
– Application specific CA (ticket authorization) 
• All nodes must trust a CA 
• CAs can be public and/or private 
– OEM CA 
– Verisign CA 
– European Union CA 
– National CAs 
– ... 
• CAs can be designed hierarchically 
– EU root CA 
– National sub CAs [CADZOW] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1.14 Enrolment Authority: Example 
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Figure 23 : Enrolment Authority: Example [CADZOW] 
  
A revised ERCA can be a candidate to be the European Enrolment Authority CA in the Figure 23. It 
would be a good strategy to keep in mind ITS in the future ERCA. 
 
7.1.15 GeoNetworking 
The ITS ad hoc network shall provide the transport of [IPv6] packets enhanced by GeoNetworking 
[ETSI 102 636-3] for communication among ITS stations. The delivery of IPv6 packets shall be 
achieved by IPv6 in GeoNetworking header tunnelling, i.e. encapsulation of IPv6 packets (header and 
payload) into GeoNetworking packet headers and routing of the encapsulated packets by the 
GeoNetworking protocol. From the IPv6 layer perspective, the ITS stations should appear as attached 
to the same IPv6 'link'. For different communication scenarios, such for ad hoc networking among ITS 
stations without connectivity to a communication infrastructure or for communication with IPv6 nodes 
in the Internet, when access to the communication infrastructure is available, specific mechanisms for 
IPv6 address configuration shall be applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
48
 
Figure 24 - GeoNetworking protocol stack in an ITS station [ETSI 102 636-3] 
 
Geo-networking address outbound message to specific geographic location. When vehicle ITS stations 
have access to a communication infrastructure, IPv6 support over geoNetworking should be enhanced 
with solutions for IP mobility support. Those solutions achieve global reachability of IP nodes and IP 
session continuity.  
 
 
7.1.16 ITS Station Implementations 
 
 
Figure 25 - ITS station implementation [CALM ITS] 
 
In a "simple" implementation of an OBE (On Board Equipment), as e.g. used in the Cooperative 
Vehicle-Infrastructure Systems [CVIS] project, the whole functionality of the ITS-S is implemented in 
two physical units, which are interconnected via the IST station-internal network. In this example, 
distinction is made between an ITS-S Host and an ITS-S Router with some functionality of a host. 
An ITS-S Router [ISO-21217] contains the communication interfaces and protocols needed to connect 
to another ITS-S unit. An ITS-S Host contains ITS-S applications. 
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There is station-internal management communications between these two units of the OBE as 
specified in [ISO-24102-3]. As the ITS station-internal network is observable, this management 
communications needs to be secured in order to protect the ITS-S from unauthorized manipulations, 
which might have an impact on the whole ITS. 
 
IEEE 802.11p [802.11p] is an approved amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard to add wireless 
access in vehicular environments (WAVE). It defines enhancements to 802.11 (the basis of products 
marketed as Wi-Fi) required to support Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications. This 
includes data exchange between high-speed vehicles and between the vehicles and the roadside 
infrastructure in the licensed ITS band of 5.9 GHz (5.85-5.925 GHz). IEEE 1609 is a higher layer 
standard on which IEEE 802.11p is based.[IEEE 1609] 
802.11p will be used as the groundwork for Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) 
 
 
Figure 26 
- 
Frequency 
allocation 
in the 
European 
Union 
[ITS 
WG4] 
 
ETSI 
ITS-G5 
is the 
current 
vehicle-
to-
vehicle 
communication technology in Europe, which will be standardized by ETSI TC ITS. It is based on 
IEEE 802.11p and therefore uses a CSMA/CA scheme for Media Access Control (MAC). ITS-G5A 
(European profile) in 5.875 GHz to 5.905 GHz frequency range. 
 
7.1.17  C2C-CC architecture 
 
This section is extracted from [C2C-CC Architecture] 
 
 
 
 
50
 
Figure 27 : 
C2C-CC 
architecture 
: outcomes 
integrated 
in ETSI 
ITS [C2C-
CC 
Architecture] 
 
PHY : 
 OFDM mod of 802.11a  
 10MHz channels, double GI, MCS 2 for G5CC and G5SC1, MCS 4 for other G5SCs 
 
MAC : CSMA/CA MAC + 802.11e QOS 
 No more association, authentication, probe request (scan) in Management frames. 
 New Timing Advertisement Management frame: (Synchronization using TSF) 
 new EDCA 802.11 parameters (QoS) mapped to logical channels: CCH with optimized CW 
and AIFSN 
 
Control channel  
 Broadcast communication 
 Dedicated to short, high-priority, data and management frames: 
 Safety-critical communication with low latencies 
 Initialization of two-way communication on SCH 
Service channel 
 Two-way communication between RSU and OBU or between OBUs 
 For specific applications, e.g. tolling, internet access 
 Different kinds of applications can be executed in parallel on different service channels 
 
C2C Network Layer 
 wireless multi hop communications based on geographical addressing and routing protocol  
 Location table, beaconing, location service, geographical addressing, forwarding algorithms 
 
Congestion control 
 
 priority handling, load indication from wireless channel, transmit power control, packet 
discard mechanisms, data and packet rate control 
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CAM messages in facilities layer 
 
 (Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) distributed within the ITS-G5 (802.11p) 
network 
 information of presence, positions, status of communicating ITS stations to neighboring 
ITS stations located within a single hop distance  
 IPv6 stack implemented in mobile router 
 Mobile IPv6 (tunneling) 
 NEMO (network mobility management) 
 Multi Care of address (simultaneous access networks) multihoming 
 QoS for traffic prioritization 
 
7.1.18 C2C-CC PKI Proposal 
 
This section and all the fourth level sub sections are composed of extractions from Public Key 
Infrastructure Memo [C2CC PKI] of Car 2 Car Communication Consortium. 
The proposed solution for a C2C PKI consists of three different, basic types of CAs (relationships 
depicted in Figure 28 ):  
 Root certificate authority (RCA)  
 Long-Term certificate authority (LTCA)  
 Pseudonym certificate authority (PCA)  
The role of the Root CA is to define common policies among all subordinate certificate issuers. The 
RCA only issues certificates for Long-Term CAs and Pseudonym CAs, which are valid over long 
periods. A certification process which needs interaction with the RCA is only required once a new 
LTCA or PCA is created, and when the lifetime of an LTCA or PCA certificate expires. Such a 
process should be standardized in order to enable an overall trustworthy usage of RCA issued 
certificates. It is the task of the RCA to check that the RCAs’ certificate issuance policies are adhered 
to by LTCAs and PCAs. 
If there are multiple RCAs, they may cross-certify each other. For mutual trust between Root CAs a 
cross certification is reasonable because it allows more flexible trust relationships between the Root 
CAs. However, the overall number of RCAs shall be kept as small as possible. 
In the proposed solution as shown in Figure 28, a Root Certificate Authority (depicted in Figure 28 as 
RCA2) on a European level is proposed to be used as central trust anchor. In order to extend the 
solution for world-wide interoperability, all existing RCAs may cross certify each other. Every cross 
certification is done with two new certificates stating the mutual trust status between both Root CAs. 
Any other cross certification between CAs other than RCAs, i.e. between Long-term CAs and between 
Pseudonym CAs, is not allowed. 
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Figure 28 - Proposed PKI Structure 
 
Based on enrolment processes at the Root CA, different institutions may be possible operators of a 
Long-Term CA (LTCA):  
 Organisations such as the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC)  
 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)  
 Suppliers  
 Countries  
 Trusted Third Parties (e.g. After market supplier)  
Every LTCA has a Long-Term CA certificate that is signed with the private key of the Root CA. With 
a similar process the Root CA issues Pseudonym CAs that provide afterwards valid Pseudonym CA 
certificates. In the proposed design only the Root CA is able to issue Long-Term and Pseudonym CAs.  
Afterwards, the LTCA issues for each responsible ITS station one Long-Term Certificates (LTC), that 
is valid for a longer period1. Each LTC created by a LTCA is dedicated to identify and authenticate 
the respective ITS station within the PKI and potentially other services, but they are never exposed to 
the G5A communication for privacy reasons. In contrast, Pseudonym Certificates (PCs) issued by 
PCAs are used for the G5A broadcast communication. PCs are dedicated to have a short lifetime and 
are exchanged frequently.  
For the long-term certification, LTCAs must provide suitable processes to associate an LTC to an ITS 
station, to revoke and to update it. For the provisioning of PCs, an efficient refill process is required, 
but it is sufficient for an ITS station to prove ownership of the private key of its LTC to acquire new 
pseudonyms. 
 
7.1.18.1 Cost efficiency of a Root CA  
 
Having a Root CA as central trust anchor the registration of new Long-Term CAs and Pseudonym CAs 
is more easy and cost efficient than without such a central trust anchor. It was discussed to allow 
independent LTCAs and PCAs and let the car manufacturer decide, which LTCAs and PCAs to add to 
the list of trusted CAs. However, this has the disadvantage of less comparable trust of different CAs 
that use different policies. Moreover, assuming several hundred Long-Term CAs are present 
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worldwide, a new Pseudonym CA operator has to make contractual relationships with all Long-Term 
CAs in order to be admitted. In such a scenario the number of contracts (and costs) is raising in a 
quadratic manor whereas a Root CA leads to simple linear effort. Furthermore, the distribution of 
updates to the vehicles containing the new list of Pseudonym CAs would be challenging if we assume 
vehicles may not be reachable for a longer time. For these reasons, Root CAs are proposed as a trust 
anchor of all other CAs (LTCA, PCA). The update or exchange of Root CAs on ITS stations is only 
possible if at least one Root CA certificate is still valid and can be used to sign the updates. Updates on 
the root layer can be assumed to be rarely. 
 
7.1.18.2 Pseudonym Verification  
 
Vehicles on the road receive messages very frequently from other ITS stations (other vehicles, 
roadside stations, traffic management centers, etc.). Verifying the integrity and authenticity of each 
incoming message requires to verify not only the message but also the sender’s Pseudonym Certificate. 
Especially verifying the latter can under certain situations require up to five steps:  
 If a pseudonym previously has been verified successfully then the sender’s certificate can be 
considered authentic.  
 Else if the Pseudonym Certificate signer (i.e. Pseudonym CA certificate) is known and has 
been verified successfully the sender’s certificate can be considered authentic.  
 Else if Pseudonym CA certificate is known and has been verified successfully then the sender’s 
certificate can be considered authentic. If the Pseudonym CA certificate is not available then 
the Pseudonym CA certificate has to be requested from the sender as described in section 6.5.  
 Else if the Root CA certificate (signer of the Long-Term CA certificate) is known and has been 
verified successfully then the sender’s certificate can be considered authentic. If the Root CA 
certificate is not available then the sender’s certificate cannot be authenticated.  
It has to be remarked that the validity of every certificate has to be checked in every step. For 
optimization purposes an 8 byte signer ID (Cert-ID) is stored in all certificates. If a verified signer ID 
can be found in the local certificate store then only the expiry date has to be checked. As described in 
section 8.2 revocation of CA certificates is proposed. Therefore in every verification step the CRL has 
to be searched.  
In this PKI concept special restrictions of specific countries or companies have been considered. Some 
countries may not accept Pseudonym Certificates that are distributed by foreign instances. As solution 
a country can operate an own Pseudonym CA that have to cooperate with the Long-Term CAs of the 
vehicles in order to provide Pseudonym Certificates. Such a country would be able to control privacy 
protection mechanisms by resolving the link between distributed PCs and the respective Long-Term 
Certificate. Furthermore, a regular pseudonym change can be prevented by distributing only one 
Pseudonym Certificate. 
7.1.18.3 Initialization of ITS stations  
 
The provisioning of the ITS Stations with the initial LTC is the task of the manufacturer. It has to be 
guaranteed that only valid vehicles are able to get a Long-Term Certificate. Access to the LTCA has to 
be protected so that only authorized entities (e.g. OEM, Supplier) are able to send requests for LTCs.  
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The process as depicted in Figure 29 refers to the very first Long-Term Certificate assignment after 
production of the C2X Security Module. It shows a possible implementation of a secure initial LTC 
provisioning. However, the concrete implementation of LTC provisioning is up to each OEM. The 
described process should be seen as a reference.  
On the one hand it has to be ensured that only authenticated Security Modules are receiving a Long-
Term Certificate. On the other hand only authorized Long-Term CAs shall be allowed to assign Long-
Term Certificates to that Security Module. Please note that within this process we take into account 
that the manufacturer and Long-Term CA may be two separate entities, e.g. supplier and OEM. In 
principle the same process may be applied within a single entity in case the manufacturer of the 
security module also serves as Long-Term CA. 
 
 
Figure 29 - Authentication Process for initial Long-Term Certificate assignment 
 
According to Figure 29 the supplier triggers the Security Module to generate a public/private key pair. 
To avoid confusion with previous terminology those keys are named as Module Authentication Keys. 
The Module Authentication Private Key is permanently stored at the Security Module and later used 
for authentication towards the Long-Term CA. The corresponding Module Authentication Public Key, 
together with the Module-ID is delivered to the assigned Long-Term CA via a secure communication 
link. Once the Security Module has been delivered to the OEM, the key generation is triggered again, 
to produce a public/private key pair for a Long-Term Certificate. That public key is sent as part of a 
certificate request to the Long-Term CA, signed via the Module Authentication Private Key. The 
Long-Term CA is verifying the signature based on the Security Module-ID and the corresponding 
Module Authentication Public Key. Only if the signature verification succeeds, the Long-Term 
Certificate is created and stored back on the Security Module. That way only authorized security 
modules receive a valid Long-Term Certificate. 
 
7.1.18.4 Update of LTCs  
The update of the LTC can be similar to a Pseudonym Certificate request. The Long-Term Certificate 
request may be signed by the valid LTC of the requester. This process is only possible if the Long-
Term Certificate is still valid and the lifetime is not expired. In the case that the LTC is expired, the 
OEM has to define a process that may be similar to the provisioning.  
In order to update an expired or corrupted Long-Term Certificate a similar process as the initial 
provisioning of LTC is proposed. In general we assume that service stations (e.g. garages, car dealer, 
etc.) will serve as communication interface to Long-Term CAs. To issue a new Long-Term Certificate 
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the security module generates a new key pair and signs the public key with the Module Authentication 
Private Key as described before. Based on the Module-ID the service station queries the corresponding 
Module Authentication Public Key to perform the authentication. Please note that the old Long-Term 
Certificate may thereby be used to identify the former Long-Term CA for direct association. If the 
security module is authorized, the Long-Term Certificate is created and stored on the Security Module.  
For being able to update the Long-Term Certificate at any time after the vehicle e has left the OEM’s 
factory it is required to store all Security Module Authentication public keys in a secure storage within 
the Long-Term CA. 
 
7.1.18.5 Obtaining new pseudonyms  
Communication Channels for Pseudonym Requests 
For retrieving new Pseudonyms a communication channel between the Pseudonym CA to be used and 
the ITS station has to exist. The following types of communication channels could be regarded for 
Pseudonym Certificate updates:  
 IEEE 802.11p (e.g., via IRS)  
 IEEE 802.11a/b/g consumer WLAN (e.g., via IRS or other hotspots and home networks)  
 Cellular link  
 On Board Diagnosis (OBD) (e.g., at Service garage, TÜV / MOT)  
 Removable media (SD-Card, Smart Card, USB Stick, …)  
 Wireless link (e.g., Bluetooth, IR, …)  
 Wired connection at an electric charging station  
 
General reloading process 
 
The general process for requesting pseudonyms can be described as following.  
 
 An ITS Station generates private and public key pairs and creates a Pseudonym request 
message containing the created public keys together with the senders Long-Term Certificate. 
The availability of a link to the Long-Term CA (e.g. IP address, ID, etc) is necessary because 
the Pseudonym CA may not be able to identify the used Long-Term CA by just the signer ID. 
Afterwards the sender signs the request with its private key of the Long-Term Certificate and 
sends it to the Pseudonym CA. Only the Long-Term Certificate can be used to sign the 
pseudonym request. Furthermore, this concept considers only the solution to generate key pairs 
in the vehicle. The generation of key pairs in the PCA can be kept as alternative solution, but 
should be used only as a backup because of slight security and privacy disadvantages.  
 The Pseudonym CA sends the request to the responsible Long-Term CA which verifies the 
Pseudonym request with the senders Long-Term Certificate included in the pseudonym request. 
Subsequently the Long-Term CA notifies the Pseudonym CA if the pseudonym certificates can 
be created.  
 In case of a positive feedback from the Long-Term CA, the Pseudonym CA creates the new 
Pseudonym Certificates with an appropriate expiry date and signs the certificate with its private 
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key. Afterwards, the Pseudonym Certificate is sent to the appropriate ITS Station over a secure 
communication channel.  
In order to protect the driver’s privacy besides the Pseudonym Certificate all identification attributes 
have to be changed regularly. As described in section 4, ITS Stations create key pairs locally and send 
the public key to the Pseudonym CA in order to get a Pseudonym Certificate. Due to different 
communication types as mentioned in section 6.3, we do not assume a continuous link to a Pseudonym 
CA. In the deployment phase of the C2C system, roadside stations will only cover a very small 
percentage of the road system in Europe and not all vehicles will be equipped with cellular 
communication technology. Therefore, we assume that a communication between vehicles and a CA 
may happen extremely seldom. 
The Pseudonym CA is responsible for issuing Pseudonym certificates for the requester. The requester 
generates a number of key pairs which is not further specified. Depending on the vehicle’s system 
performance or the available communication link only a small set of pseudonym can be requested or a 
large set which would cover several months. The public keys are transmitted to the Pseudonym CA for 
issuing. Depending on policies the PCA decides how many pseudonyms will be issued with which 
validity as indicated before.  
The final setting of these crucial parameters determines both the security and privacy – and thus the 
trust – of the entire PKI. In addition, too strict parameters reduce the flexibility, e.g. for refilling the 
Pseudonym Certificate pool. 
 
7.1.18.6 Refill process  
As displayed in Figure 30 the vehicle sends a request to a predefined Pseudonym CA (e.g. Home 
PCA). This request includes the signer ID of the Long-Term Certificate, the list of public keys, the 
current position and an ID or address of the Long-Term CA. 
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Figure 30 - Pseudonym Request 
 
If a Pseudonym CA receives a request it checks if it is allowed to issue Pseudonyms for the request. 
For example, if another Pseudonym CA is responsible for the region of the requester, then the request 
is forwarded to the appropriate Pseudonym CA such as displayed in Figure 30.  
For privacy reasons the signer ID of the sender can be encrypted with the public key of the Long-Term 
CA. In this case, the Pseudonym CA is not able to create a link between the pseudonyms and the 
Long-Term-ID of the vehicle. Also the Long-Term CA is not able to create such a link because the 
Pseudonym CA is not forwarding the public keys or pseudonym certificates. Based on legislation, the 
signer ID can also be transmitted unencrypted so that the Pseudonym CA is able to operate a database 
with links between the Long-Term CA and the Pseudonym Certificates.  
The appropriate Pseudonym CA sends a request with the (encrypted) signer ID of the requester, a 
calculated preloading time and the region ID to the Long-Term CA for verification. The Long-Term 
CA maintains a database that stores the timestamp until a vehicle has valid pseudonyms for a distinct 
region. Only if the following checks are successful the Pseudonym CA gets a positive response from 
the Long-Term CA. 
 
 Signer ID of LTC can be found at the LTCA and the certificate is not deactivated.  
 There are no pseudonyms issued for the given region ID until the given preloading time.  
 
The Long-Term CA sends a positive or negative response with a start timestamp for new pseudonyms 
back to the Pseudonym CA. With this procedure the PKI can circumvent that vehicles request 
pseudonyms for the same time interval from different or the same Pseudonym CA. After the creation 
of Pseudonym Certificates on the PCA, a digest of the pseudonym set is created and sent to the 
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responsible LTCA. On the LTCA a symmetric key for the pseudonym set is created, stored in the 
database as well as sent back to the PCA. If the requested pseudonyms are designed for usage in near 
future time, then the set of Pseudonyms is sent to the ITS station without encryption. Otherwise, if the 
pseudonyms are designed for a farther future time interval then the set is encrypted with the symmetric 
key received from the LTCA in order to prevent misuse.  
Therefore, short connectivity over G5A for pseudonym requests can be considered because only a key 
has to be transmitted in order to use preloaded Pseudonym Certificates. Furthermore, the concept 
enables the endowment of pseudonym for farther future time intervals by restricting the number of 
pseudonym that can be used in the near future. In order to decrypt a pseudonym set on the ITS station 
it can request the symmetric key from a PCA by sending the digest of the pseudonym set as displayed 
in Figure 31. The PCA forwards this digest to the responsible LTCA which answers with the key if 
available. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Request of Key in order to decrypt preloaded Pseudonyms 
 
Also if the keys for the pseudonyms are generated on the ITS station they can only be used in the V2X 
communication if signed certificates are available signed by a CA. In case of encrypted Pseudonym 
Certificates available on the ITS station messages can be correctly signed with the private key but 
without an issued certificate the receiver is not able to verify the sender’s authenticity. 
 
 
7.1.18.7 Creation of new CAs  
 
 There must be minimum requirements for a CA.  
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 Root CA could be operated by an well-respected and specialized entity for PKI and IT security, 
such as e.g. BSI, Euro PKI or US DOT, etc.  
 The C2C-CC should suggest security guidelines in the TF-PKI that can be used by the Root CA 
operator.  
 Policies are the result of a discussion between the C2C-CC, legislation, potential operators, etc.  
 
7.1.18.8 Distribution of new CA certificates  
 
In the first place, distribution of certificates of new CAs should be done over the key store update, e.g. 
during a reload process of new pseudonyms. Especially, new RCA certificates must only be transferred 
to ITS stations using the key store update process. Yet, it may happen that a vehicle has not executed 
an update process for a while. In such a case, if a PCA certificate in the local key / certificate store on 
an ITS station is not available to verify pseudonyms a decentralized mechanism is approached to 
retrieve it. As described in section 5.1 Pseudonym Certificates from other ITS stations will only be 
accepted if a verification up to a Root CA is possible.  
If the receiver of a message does not have appropriate certificates to verify the certificate chain from 
the Pseudonym Certificate up to Root CA certificate then a new message with the Cert-ID of the 
missing certificate is sent via unicast to the sender. Thereupon, the receiver of this request creates a 
response and broadcasts the respective PCA certificate. 
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7.2 Introduction of mobile signature in DT  
 
 
 
Figure 32 : Mobile signature in DTS 
 
7.2.1 What is Mobile Signature 
Mobile Signature is a service which enables the user to fulfill electronic signature processes, which is 
legally binding signature, in accordance with National Electronic Signature Law which is based on the 
EU Electronic signature directive [E-SIGN-DIRECTIVE] by using mobile phone and GSM SIM card. 
“Signature creation data” of the Qualified Electronic Certificate which can be acquired only after SIM 
Operator Mobile Signature subscription, formed specially and uniquely to signature holder and stored 
in the high security area of the SimPlus128 Card. 
Mobile Signature service works with the usage of signature creation data stored in the high security 
area along with the application stored in the same place. 
Electronic signature process can be realized securely only when user enter his/her Mobile Signature 
password. Mobile Signature is used on the SIM card and cannot be sent to anywhere else. 
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According to the national electronic signature legislation, electronic signature holder’s security 
concerning the signature shall be guaranteed. The related technical infrastructure and the security of 
the operations are supervised and certified periodically in accordance with ISO/IEC 27001 Information 
Security Management System standards by independent bodies, e.g., BSI. 
The SIM Card that is compatible with Mobile Signature is certified with the highest security CC 
EAL4+ Security Certificate as required by the related legislations. It is solid against the most advanced 
attacks. The signature creation data in the card can under no circumstance be copied.  
Electronic signature is generated when the user enters his/her Mobile Signature password to the SIM 
card via their mobile phone’s keypad. Thus the messages received or sent are directly addressed to the 
SIM card and they are stored in the SIM card. 
 
7.2.2 Introduction of Mobile Signatures into DTS 
Although Mobile Signature application in DTS needs to be further investigated for a precise proposal, 
the process can be summarized in the following steps: 
 
 Drivers can authenticate to a central server with a mobile signature through their mobile phones 
over GSM network.  
 The mobile signature is generated on the data: “Driver ID + truck ID + GPS Unit ID + GPS 
location + GSM time + start indication” 
 Driver authenticates to the server when his/her signature is verified on the server.  
 GSM and GPS provides speed and location information to the server until the driver sign out 
from the server by sending mobile signature on the data: “Driver ID + truck ID + GPS Unit ID 
+ GPS location + GSM time + stop indication” 
 Driver is signed out from the server when his/her signature is verified on the server.  
 The position information is provided by GPS is double checked on the server with the position 
information provided by GSM  
 Public key certificates will be issued by the member state CAs to the drivers rather than the 
tachograph equipment.  
 The key generation on the SIM card and activation of the mobile signature service is  provided 
by a certification authority in agreement with a GSM operator.  
 ERCA as the top level authority remains as as the European root CA. Member state CA’s 
provide public key certification service to the persons through a GSM operator.  
 Drivers subscribe to a mobile operator for tachograph application on their SIM cards, or the 
application can be loaded to the SIM card by an online service.  
 The mobile digital signatures will comply with the EU electronic signature law.  
 Security update of the Mobile Signature enabled tachograph system will be easier as the 
application on the SIM card will be flexible for updates. 
 Public key certificate revocation will be possible as the system will be online. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
In order for the DTS to be more secure and less vulnerable to threats it must be fully adapted to more 
standardized technologies.  
The technology is developing very fast and as a result the algorithms used in DTS become obsolete. 
Therefore the DTS must be revised to make it adaptable to new technologies and standards. The 
advantages of using standardized schemes will be numerous: more interoperability of the system with 
other systems, availability of off-the-shelf products, easier maintenance and higher system security.  
DT security model should recognize that we are dealing with the ERCA/DT as a closed system which 
hence may face a different scale of risk threats than an open system. Consequently for the update of 
the system security, e.g., the impact of increasing the key length, must be evaluated according to the 
closed system.  
A generic protection profile which defines abstract functionality including the migration concept for 
DT, as the flexibility to update the security in DT is crucial, is needed. 
An Algo paper “The crypto in demand “ for the DT closed system which is revised in certain intervals 
of time, e.g., every 5 years, is also needed.  The Algo paper shall contain detailed information 
regarding the use of a certain cryptographic algorithm with certain parameters, e.g., key length, for a 
certain interval of time. The Algo paper could be an appendix to the abstract Protection Profile. 
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) can be the address of the research on the future Digital 
Tachograph system. The idea of expansion of Digital Tachograph to ITS must be investigated for that 
purpose. 
During the DT revision process towards the next generation Digital Tachograph, it must be kept in 
mind that ITS could replace DT in a decade. Working on a generic protection profile for DT which 
allows eventual expansion to ITS could facilitate the future developments in DT to converge to ITS. 
Evolution of ERCA towards a Root CA as central trust anchor for ITS should also to be considered in 
the research for the future DTS. 
The idea of using mobile signature as an alternative solution in the future DTS should be given a 
chance for further investigation of the idea as it can simplify the management of the system and its 
infrastructure.  
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